To Breathe, or Not to Breathe: Passive
Alcohol Sensors and the Fourth
Amendment*
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I. INTRODUCTION
The P.A.S.™ Passive Alcohol Sensor III (nicknamed the "Sniffer")
(Sniffer) stepped into the technology arena to do battle with drunk
driving. Like any good battle, the fans are divided, with the Sniffer's
maker, PAS Systems International, Inc., and law enforcement officials
on one side and civil liberties groups and drivers on the other. The Sniffer
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is a hand-held, battery-powered flashlight with a built-in alcohol sensor.'
As a police officer shines the flashlight in a driver's face, the Sniffer
samples exhaled breath as the driver speaks, analyzing it for the presence
of alcohol.2 In a matter of seconds, a color-coded display on the
flashlight alerts the officer to the presence of alcohol and provides an
approximate blood alcohol concentration (BAC). 3 Because the driver's
active participation is not needed to produce a BAC reading, the Sniffer
is heralded as a "passive" device. 4 The Sniffer can detect alcohol in a
person's breath as well as alcohol that may be in the ambient air inside a
vehicle due to exhaled breath in the enclosed space or open containers of
alcohol. 5 The point of this "nonintrusive" device is to help police
officers formulate the probable cause needed to warrant an arrest without
the driver's active involvement. 6
This usage, however, is the very reason battle lines are being drawn.
Let the Sniffer be the swords of the law enforcement officials, and the
Fourth Amendment becomes the shield to those who would oppose its
use. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution7 protects
1. PAS Systems International Inc., P.A.S. III Sniffer, at http://www.sniff
alcohol.com/prod0l.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2002). The Web site, however, calls the
Sniffer a "Non-Invasive Alcohol Screening Instrument with a Built-In High Intensity
Flashlight." Id.
2. Id. The Web site provides, "The P.A.S.™ III, unlike active hand-held breath
analyzers, samples air in front of and around an individual just as a person may smell
another's breath. The P.A.S.™ III does not touch a person in any way." Id.
3. Id. The Web site shows a picture of the Sniffer and supplies directions for its use:
Taking a Breath Sample: 1) Hold the P.A.S. about 5-7 inches from subject's
mouth[;] 2) Have subject speak for 5 to 10 seconds (example: have subject
give name, address, and date of birth)[;] 3) Tap power switch once and release
while the subject is speaking[;] 4) Watch bars light up; wait about 20 seconds
until peak reading is established; Note this reading[;] 5) Tap power switch
again to tum off the sensor[;] 6) See reverse side for approximate B.A.C.
Id. On the flashlight's color-coded display, an approximate B.A.C. of .01 or .02 shows a
green light; approximate B.A.C.'s of .03, .04, .05, and .06 show a yellow light; and
approximate B.A.C.'s of .08, .10, and .12 show a red light. Id.
4. Id. Arguably, by requiring a breath sample from the driver which presumably
is going to come from the driver's act of speaking, the driver is "actively" participating
in the Sniffer's operation. The contrast between having the driver speak to generate
breath samples for the Sniffer and having the driver actively blow into a traditional
breathalyzer is likely the distinguishing characteristic that makes the Sniffer a "passive"
device.
5. Id. Furthermore, the Sniffer's alcohol sensor is "unaffected by acetone, paint
and glue fumes, foods, confectionery, methane and practically any other substance likely
to be found in the breath (other than alcohol)." Id.
6. Id. The Web site provides: "there should be no question of a 'trespass' or
'intrusion' into the privacy of an individual. It is not an evidential test and its results
should not be presented as such." Id.
7. The Fourth Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949); see also Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that the exclusionary rule of the Fourth
Amendment is also applicable to the states).
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against unreasonable searches and seizures. 8 A seizure takes place when
a police officer, "by means of physical force or show of authority, has in
some way restrained the liberty of a citizen."9 Additionally, "a person
has been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if,
in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable
person would have believed that he was not free to leave." 10 Following
the Supreme Court's paramount decision in Katz v. United States, 11 for a
search to have occurred, a person must be able to claim a reasonable
expectation of privacy into which the government has intruded. 12 A
reasonable expectation of privacy is recognized where a person has an
actual, subjective expectation of privacy, which is objectively reasonable. 13
Where no reasonable expectation of privacy exists, governmental action
does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. 14 Moreover,
once classified as a search, governmental action is only proscribed by
8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. In full, it states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized. Id.
9. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 19 n.16 (1968).
10. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
11. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
12. This test has evolved from Justice Harlan's statement in his concurring opinion
in Katz that "a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of
privacy." Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
740 (1979) ("Consistently with Katz, this Court uniformly has held that the application
of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person invoking its protection can
claim a 'justifiable,' a 'reasonable,' or a 'legitimate expectation of privacy' that has been
invaded by government action.").
13. Smith, 442 U.S. at 740. In construing the meaning of a reasonable expectation
of privacy, the Court said:
[A]s Mr. Justice Harlan aptly noted in his Katz concurrence, [this inquiry]
normally embraces two discrete questions. The first is whether the individual,
by his conduct, has "exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation ofprivacy,"whether, in the words of the Katz majority, the individual has shown that "he
seeks to preserve [something] as private." The second question is whether the
individual's subjective expectation of privacy is "one that society is prepared
to recognize as 'reasonable,"'-whether, in the words of the Katz majority, the
individual's expectation, viewed objectively, is '1ustifiable" under the
circumstances.
Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
14. E.g., id. at 745-46 (holding that the installation and use of a pen register was
not a search under the Fourth Amendment because the defendant had "no actual
expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he dialed, and that, even if he did, his
expectation was not" objectively reasonable).
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the Fourth Amendment if it constitutes an unreasonable search. 15 The
reasonableness of a governmental search, in tum, depends upon
"balancing its intrusion on [an] individual's Fourth Amendment interests
against [the search' s] promotion of legitimate governmental interests." 16
In construing this balancing test, the Supreme Court delineated three
factors to be examined in each particular case to assess reasonablenessthe nature of the individual's privacy interest, the character of the
intrusion, and the nature and immediacy of the governmental interest at
issue. 17
Lurking somewhere in the gamut of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
lies the framework under which the constitutionality of the Sniffer will
be tested. Because opponents and proponents of the Sniffer both find
and proclaim different aspects of Fourth Amendment law to justify their
conflicting positions over the Sniffer, the battle, which has yet to make it
inside any court, is a complicated tangle of constitutional interpretation.
In simplest terms, the issue to be addressed is whether the use of the
Sniffer is constitutionally permissible under the Fourth Amendment.
A brief overview of the various arguments for and against the Sniffer
may be useful at this point to highlight some of the areas that will be
addressed. Opponents of the Sniffer take issue with the fact that police
officers who utilize these flashlights can ascertain a driver's BAC
without the driver having consented to testing and without the driver
even knowing that such testing has commenced. 18 With the more
traditional Breathalyzer™, which requires the driver to blow into a
device, and with field sobriety tests, which require the driver to perform
physical tests, the driver has implicitly consented and presumably knows
the officer's purpose is to ascertain intoxication. 19 With the Sniffer, as
the argument goes, officers are able to conduct searches without the
15. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) ("[W]hat the Constitution forbids is not all
searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures.") (quoting Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960)). "[T]he central inquiry under the Fourth
Amendment [is] the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular
governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security." Id. at 19.
16. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979); see also Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977). In Mimms, the Court said:
The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always "'the
reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion
of a citizen's personal security."' Reasonableness, of course, depends "'on a
balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal
security free from arbitrary interference by law officers."'
Id. at 108-09 (citations omitted) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19; United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)).
17. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654-64 (1995).
18. Eric Peters, Vaporizing Personal Rights?, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2000, at
A18, 2000 WL 4164640.
19. See id.
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driver's lrnowledge or consent, perhaps even before the driver has done
anything which would suggest to an officer that the driver has been
drinking. 20 After the Sniffer has provided the officer with a BAC
reading, the officer is possibly only then armed with probable cause to
believe the driver has been drinking and may then require the driver to
undergo further alcohol testing to assess whether the driver should be
arrested. 21
Civil liberties groups and defense lawyers argue that the hidden breath
alcohol screening instrument inside the flashlight violates the driver's
right to privacy when it tests a breath sample.22 As long as the driver's
breath is still in the car, that breath is "in a zone of privacy."23 Other
arguments suggesting that use of the Sniffer constitutes an unreasonable
search and seizure have included the following: in using the Sniffer,
officers are impermissibly enhancing their sense of smell to reveal the
presence of alcohol;24 for drivers who are pulled over because of minor
traffic violations, the use of the Sniffer becomes a fishing expedition to
catch alcohol-impaired drivers; 25 because a trained officer can use his or
her own natural senses in observing and speaking to a driver to assess
whether field sobriety tests or Breathalyzer tests are needed, sticking the
flashlight in a driver's face is intrusive;26 and, the Sniffer gives officers
discretion to decide whether any particular driver will be tested and
hence discretion to invade a person's privacy.27
Proponents of the Sniffer find no fault with a device that "is nothing
more than an extension of an officer's nose." 28 The Sniffer is meant to
help an officer establish probable cause to make an arrest and is not
intended to replace traditional Breathalyzer and field sobriety tests. 29

20. Id.
21. Warren Richey, Will Privacy Rights Pass the Smell Test?: Police in Half the
States are Using Hidden Breathalyzers to Help Catch Drunk Drivers, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Aug. 23, 2000, at 2, available at 2000 WL 4430443.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Mary P. Gallagher, Civil Libertarians Wince at New Device that 'Shines Light'
on Drunken Drivers, N.J. L.J., Aug. 21, 2000, WL 161 NJLJ 782.
25. Id.
26. See id.
21. Id.
28. Joey Ledford, The Lane Ranger: If It Drives Like a Drunk, and Smells Like a
Drunk ..., A1LANTA J. & CONST., Apr. 21, 1999, at 2B, 1999 WL 3769599 (quoting
Jarel. R. Kelsey, President of PAS Systems).
29. Id.
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The device is used only to determine whether further testing is needed. 30
Other arguments backing the Sniffer include: the probable cause
determination can be made faster by utilizing a Sniffer than by leaving
the officers to their own natural senses; 31 more drunk drivers will be
caught when officers are using the device because it is more objective
than other police procedures; 32 detecting more drunk drivers justifies the
"minor inconvenience to drivers;"33 all the device is doing is sampling
air that has already left the driver's body; 34 drivers do not enjoy a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their exhaled breath; 35 exhaled
breath is "abandoned property" and thus not protected under the Fourth
Amendment; 36 the "plain sight doctrine" allows the officer to observe,
with his senses, breath which is in plain sight without violating the
Fourth Amendment;37 and finally, the results of the Sniffer are not
admissible as evidence of guilt in court. 38
The purpose of this Comment is to assess how the United States
Supreme Court would ultimately decide where the Sniffer stands vis-avis Fourth Amendment privacy rights. The benefit of a device that can
assist police officers in detecting more drunk drivers must not also
function as an affront to Fourth Amendment protections. The analysis
will flush out the various arguments supporting and denouncing the
constitutionality of the Sniffer and attempt to decipher how these
arguments square with the current state of the law.
This Comment will start with a short overview of the drunk driving
problem in the United States by referring to the statistical data of the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). The
standards of probable cause and reasonable suspicion will be briefly
discussed to demonstrate what is required of an officer to lawfully stop a
motorist and to classify the types of drivers who may be stopped by the
police. A more in-depth discussion of the law with regard to seizures
and searches will follow, focusing on what laws govern the use of
flashlights and devices used to determine the alcohol content of a breath
sample. An assessment of where the Sniffer falls in the search law arena
will be included. As part of a reasonableness inquiry, which necessitates
30. Brooke A. Masters & Tom Jackman, Sniffer Routs Out Drunk Drivers; Rights
Advocates Decry Use of Device, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 2000, at Bl.
31. See Gene Crider, Officers' New Tool to Shine light on Drunken Drivers,
HERALD (Rock Hill, S.C.), June 27, 2000, at 2B, 2000 WL 6573895.
32. See Masters & Jackman, supra note 30, at B 1.
33. Richey, supra note 21, at 2.
34. Masters & Jackman, supra note 30, at B 1.
35. Richey, supra note 21, at 2.
36. Id.
37. See id.
38. Masters & Jackman, supra note 30, at B 1.
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the use of a balancing test, the various arguments will be analyzed to
distinguish those which are legitimate from others which may be less
sound. Ultimately, this Comment will use a classification of the various
types of drivers who may be subjected to the Sniffer search depending
on the reasons for their initial detention to conclude that as to some
drivers the instrument may be constitutional, while as to others, it
transgresses Fourth Amendment protections.

II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF AMERICA'S DRUNK DRIVING PROBLEM
The statistical data on the prevalence of alcohol-related fatalities 39
attests to the tragedy of drunk driving. For the year 1999, over 41,000
persons were killed in traffic fatalities; of these, 15,976 were alcoholrelated, representing 38% of total traffic fatalities. 40 In 1998, 15,935
persons were killed in alcohol-related fatalities, again representing 38%
of total traffic fatalities for the year. 41 This figure, however, represents a
33% reduction in alcohol-related fatalities from the 23,626 persons
killed in 1988.42 Looking further back, in 1997, 16,189 persons were
killed in alcohol-related fatalities; 43 in 1996, 17,126 persons were killed
in alcohol-related crashes;44 and in 1995, 17,274 persons were killed in
39. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) identifies a fatal
traffic crash as alcohol related "if either a driver or a nonoccupant (e.g., pedestrian)
had a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.01 grams per deciliter (g/dl) or
greater in a police-reported traffic crash. Persons with a BAC of 0.10 g/dl or greater
involved in fatal crashes are considered to be intoxicated." Nat'! Highway Traffic
Safety Admin., U.S. Dep't of Transp., Traffic Safety Facts 1998: Alcohol, at
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/ncsa/FactPrev/pdf/Alcohol98.pdf (last visited Apr.
19, 2002) [hereinafter Traffic Safety Facts 1998].
40. Mothers Against Drunk Driving, Total Traffic Fatality vs. Alcohol Related
Traffic Fatality, at http://www.madd.org/stats/0,1056,1298,00.html (last visited Apr. 19,
2002) (figures provided by NHTSA).
41. Traffic Safety Facts 1998, supra note 39. The 15,935 fatalities "represent an
average of one alcohol-related fatality every 33 minutes." Id. In 1998, total traffic
fatalities equaled 41,471 persons. Id. Of these, 12,456 persons (30% of all traffic
fatalities) were killed in crashes where at least one driver or nonoccupant had a BAC of
0.10 g/dl or greater, 3479 persons (8% of all traffic fatalities) were killed in crashes
where at least one driver or nonoccupant had a BAC between 0.01 and 0.09 g/dl, and the
remaining 25,536 traffic fatalities were not alcohol related. Id.
42. Id. This represents 50% of the total traffic fatalities for 1988. Id.
43. Nat'! Highway Traffic Safety Admin., U.S. Dep't of Transp., Alcohol: Traffic
Safety Facts 1997, at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/ncsa/FactPrev/Alcohol9.html
(last visited Apr. 19, 2002).
44. Nat'! Highway Traffic Safety Admin., U.S. Dep't of Transp., Alcohol: Traffic
Safety Facts 1996, at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/ncsa/FactPrev/alc96.html (last
visited Apr. 19, 2002).
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alcohol-related crashes.45 Thus, according to these figures, from 1995
through 1999, alcohol-related traffic fatalities were decreasing. In 2000,
however, 16,653 persons were killed in alcohol-related traffic fatalities,
an increase of 4% from 1999.46
In 2000, "an estimated 310,000 persons were injured in crashes where
police reported that alcohol was present."47 According to the NHTSA,
"the rate of alcohol involvement in fatal crashes is more than 3 times as
high at night as during the day.',4 8 ''For all crashes the alcohol involvement
rate is more than 4 times as high at night [as during the day].',49
Recognizing the alarming prevalence of drunk driving accidents, the
Supreme Court noted: "The increasing slaughter on our highways, most
of which should be avoidable, now reaches the astounding figures only
heard of on the battlefield.''50
Indicative of America's continuing interest in diminishing the often
tragic incidents of drunk driving, in 2000, President Clinton signed into
law a measure that sets a national standard of a .08 BAC as the legal
level for drunk driving. 51 The measure requires states to adopt a .08
BAC standard by 2004. 52 States failing to act in accordance with the
45. Nat'! Highway Traffic Safety Admin., U.S. Dep't of Transp., Alcohol: Traffic
Safety Facts 1995, at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/peopJe/ncsa/FactPrev/alcfacts.html
(last visited Apr. 19, 2002).
46. Nat'I Highway Traffic Safety Admin., U.S. Dep't of Transp., Traffic
Safety Facts 2000: Alcohol, at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd-30/ncsa/tsf2000/
2000alcfacts.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2002).
47. Id.
48. Id. (61 % at night versus 18% during the day).
49. Id. (17% at night versus 4% during the day).
50. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957); see also Michigan Dep't of
State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990) ("No one can seriously dispute the
magnitude of the drunken driving problem or the States' interest in eradicating it. Media
reports of alcohol-related death and mutilation on the Nation's roads are legion. The
anecdotal is confirmed by the statistical.").
51. Drunk-Driving limit Is Signed into Law, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2000, at A5,
2000 WL 25424190. Citing the NHTSA, Mothers Against Drunk Driving claims, "[a]
170-pound male typically would have to consume more than four drinks in one hour on
an empty stomach to reach a BAC of .08. A 137-pound female typically would have to
consume three drinks in the same time frame" to reach a .08 BAC. Mothers Against
Drunk Driving, Stats & Resources, at http://www.madd.org/stats/0,1056,1767,00.html
(last visited Mar. 31, 2002).
52. Scott Bowles, National Drunken-Driving Standard Passes, USA TODAY, Oct.
4, 2000, at 3A, 2000 WL 5791494. As of October 2000, eighteen states and the
District of Columbia had a .08 BAC level for drunk driving and thirty-one states had a
.10 level; Massachusetts deems a .08 BAC "evidence but not proof of drunkenness."
Id. As of July 2001, the NHTSA reports that since the passage of the .08 BAC law in
October 2000, "ten [additional] states have passed Jaws or have a law pending the
Governor's signature" adopting the .08 BAC standard, bringing the total to twentyeight states complying with the new Jaw (two states have Jaws awaiting the
'Governor's signature), as well as Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia. Nat'I
Highway Traffic Safety Admin. U.S. Dep't of Transp., National Highway Traffic
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new national standard could lose millions of dollars in federal highway
funds. 53 Clinton said, "this .08 standard is the biggest step to toughen
drunk driving laws and reduce alcohol related crashes since a national
minimum drinking age was established a generation ago." 54 The new
law, according to Clinton, is reasonable and will be effective in making
drivers more careful of drinking and driving. 55 The President noted that,
"[a]lcohol is still the single greatest factor in motor vehicle deaths and
injuries. This law, .08, is simply a common sense way to help stop
that."56 Stopping "that" is, of course, a most laudable goal, one which
proponents of the Sniffer hope can be achieved by detecting more drunk
drivers in the beam of a flashlight. Where the Sniffer is concerned,
however, reducing the number of alcohol-related fatalities is not the
problem. No one can deny the societal benefits of eradicating drunk
driving. The problem, if there is one, is in the manner by which the
Sniffer detects the drunk drivers in the first place.
ill. SEIZING THE DRIVER
A. The Initial Stop of the Driver

Quite obviously, before a driver gazes into the "high intensity"
flashlight beam of the Sniffer and unwittingly provides a breath sample
for the alcohol sensor, a police officer must have stopped the driver.
Stopping a motorist implicates the Fourth Amendment because, as the
Court pointed out in Delaware v. Prouse,51 "stopping an automobile and
detaining its occupants constitute a 'seizure' within the meaning of [the
Fourth Amendment] even though the purpose of the stop is limited and
the resulting detention quite brief."58 In Prouse, a police officer stopped
Safety Administration Impaired Driving Program,

July 2001,

Legislation, at

http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/alcohol/impairedjuly/legislation.html (last
visited Apr. 12, 2002).
53. Bowles, supra note 52, at 3A. States failing to adopt the .08 BAC as the legal
level for drunk driving by 2004 will lose 2% of their federal highway funds. Id. By
2007, the penalty for noncompliance will increase to an 8% loss of federal highway
funds. Id.
54. Clinton's Remarks on Drunk Driving Standard, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Oct. 23,
2000, at 10:05 am EDT, 2000 WL 26850117. The President said experts who have
studied the .08 standard estimate that it will save at least 500 lives a year. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
58. Id. at 653; see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). In Whren,
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a vehicle merely to check the driver's license and registration and as a
result of the stop, seized some marijuana in plain view in the car. 59 The
trial court granted the driver's motion to suppress the seized narcotics
after finding the stop to be in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 60 The
Delaware Supreme Court affirmed, holding "that 'a random stop of a
motorist in the absence of specific articulable facts which justify the stop
by indicating a reasonable suspicion that a violation of the law has
occurred is constitutionally impermissible and violative of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. "'61 The
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that stopping a vehicle only to check a
license and registration, where there is neither probable cause to believe
the driver is violating the law nor reasonable suspicion to believe the
driver is unlicensed or the car unregistered, amounts to an unreasonable
seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 62
The Supreme Court upholds suspicionless seizures of motorists only
in limited situations. In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 63
the Court found no Fourth Amendment violation with regard to a
the Court stated:
Temporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the
police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a
"seizure" of "persons" within the meaning of [the Fourth Amendment]. An
automobile stop is thus subject to the constitutional imperative that it not be
"unreasonable" under the circumstances.
Id. at 809-10 (citations omitted).
59. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 650.
60. Id. at 65 l.
61. Id. As enunciated in Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373 (1993)
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)), the typical formulation of reasonable
suspicion is '"where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot ... ,'
the officer may briefly stop the suspicious person and make 'reasonable inquiries' aimed
at confirming or dispelling his suspicions." In Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330
(1990), the Court said:
Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not
only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information
that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable
cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from
information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.
62. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661, 663. The Court noted that such stops would give
officers too much discretion to stop motorists and intrude upon privacy interests
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 661-63. The Court did state, however, in
dictum, that its holding did not prevent the State of Delaware or other states "from
developing methods for spot checks that involve less intrusion or that do not involve the
unconstrained exercise of discretion." Id. at 663. The Court suggested that stopping and
questioning all traffic at roadblocks may be a constitutional alternative to the random
seizures it struck down in the case. Id.; see Richard A. Ifft, Curbing the Drunk Driver
Under the Fourth Amendment: The Constitutionality of Roadblock Seizures, 71 GEO. L.J.
1457, 1459 (1983) (suggesting that lower federal and state courts have relied on the
Prouse dictum to uphold roadblock stops).
63. 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
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sobriety checkpoint program that allowed police to stop all vehicles and
check all drivers for signs of intoxication even in the absence of
individualized suspicion that any particular driver was intoxicated.64
The Court determined that "the balance of the State's interest in
preventing drunken driving, the extent to which [the checkpoints could]
reasonably be said to advance that interest, and the degree of intrusion
upon individual motorists who are briefly stopped" justified the State's
sobriety checkpoint program. 65
Suspicionless seizures of motorists were also upheld in United States
v. Martinez-Fuerte where the Court rejected a Fourth Amendment
challenge to the operation of fixed checkpoints near the Mexican border
that allowed police to stop and briefly question motorists about their
citizenship without any individualized suspicion that any particular car
contained illegal aliens. 66 Here too, the Court engaged in a balancing
analysis, weighing the public interest against the individual's Fourth
Amendment interest in being free from arbitrary governmental
intrusions. 67
Motorists may be stopped on the basis of a reasonable articulable
suspicion.68 In United States v. Hunnicutt, 69 a police officer followed a
vehicle for about five miles as it weaved across the shoulder and center
64. See id. at 447,455. The program provided that "[a]ll vehicles passing through
a checkpoint would be stopped and their drivers briefly examined for signs of
intoxication." Id. at 447. Drivers not showing any signs of intoxication would be
permitted to go on their way. If, however, an "officer detected signs of intoxication, the
motorist would be directed to [pull aside] where an officer would check the motorist's
driver's license and car registration and, if warranted, conduct [field] sobriety tests." Id.
An arrest would be made where the combination of the officer's observations and the
field sobriety tests suggested intoxication. Id.
65. Id. at 455. This balancing test was derived from Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47,
50-51 (1979), where the court set out that "[t]he reasonableness of seizures that are less
intrusive than a traditional arrest" depends on a balance between "the gravity of the
public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the
public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty."
66. 428 U.S. 543,545 (1976).
67. Id. at 555.
68. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
Under the Fourth Amendment, we have held, a policeman who lacks probable
cause but whose "observations lead him reasonably to suspect" that a
particular person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime,
may detain that person briefly in order to "investigate the circumstances that
provoke suspicion."
Id. at439 (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,881 (1975) (footnote
omitted)).
69. 135 F.3d 1345 (10th Cir. 1998).
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line. The officer stopped the vehicle, suspecting that the driver was
under the influence of alcohol. 70 The driver argued that the stop was in
contravention of the Fourth Amendment because no traffic violations
had transpired and the lane weaving was merely a pretext to search the
vehicle. 71 The tenth circuit disagreed; to justify the stop, the government
was not required to show an actual traffic violation. 72 The court said:
An initial traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment not only if based on
an observed traffic violation, but also if the officer has a reasonable articulable
suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring....
Our sole inquiry is whether the particular officer had reasonable suspicion that
the particular motorist violated "any ... of the multitude of applicable traffic
and equipment regulations" of the jurisdiction.73

The court found the stop consistent with the Fourth Amendment
because the officer had both a reasonable articulable suspicion that the
driver had violated a traffic law pertaining to the proper use of lanes and
a reasonable articulable suspicion that the driver was under the influence
of alcohol. 74
Thus, for the initial stop to be lawful, the driver must have been pulled
over because the officer: (1) had probable cause to believe the driver had
committed a traffic violation; or (2) had a reasonable articulable
suspicion that the driver had committed a traffic violation or was under
the influence of alcohol. Also, the officer might pull over a motorist for
a traffic violation and, in the course of investigating that violation,
circumstances may give rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion that the
driver is intoxicated or under the influence of alcohol. Following
Prouse, a driver may not be pulled over for no reason (excluding
sobriety checkpoints and fixed interior border checkpoints). 75

70.
71.

Id. at 1347.
Id. at 1348.
72. Id.
73. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979)).
74. Id. In Carlsen v. Duron, No. 99-4065, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 21428, at *2,
*6-7 (10th Cir. Aug. 24, 2000), officers stopped the driver for making a wide right hand
tum in violation of a Utah statute, driving too slow, and braking for no reason. The court
concluded the stop was not only supported by probable cause due to the observed traffic
Jaw violation but also by a reasonable suspicion that the driver was under the influence
of alcohol.
75. Another case reproving random, suspicionless stops of motorists for
investigatory purposes is United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975),
which requires roving border patrol agents to have a reasonable suspicion that an
illegal alien is in the car to stop and question motorists.
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B. Arresting the Driver

To subsequently arrest a driver who has been lawfully stopped for a
traffic violation, a police officer must have probable cause. The Warrant
Clause of the Fourth Amendment provides, "no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized."76 Hence, an arrest warrant must be based upon probable
cause.77 A warrantless arrest must also be supported by probable
cause.78 "Probable cause exists where 'the facts and circumstances
within [the arresting officers'] knowledge and of which they had
reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has
been or is being committed."79 Once a lawful arrest is made, police
officers are authorized to perform a full body search of the arrestee,
pursuant to the "search incident to arrest" exception to the warrant
requirement. 80 Therefore, to effectuate a valid drunk driving arrest, an
officer must lawfully stop the driver and the vehicle and then ascertain
"facts and circumstances" giving rise to probable cause to warrant such
an arrest.

76. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
77. Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
If it appears from the complaint, or from an affidavit or affidavits filed with the
complaint, that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the defendant has committed it, a warrant for the arrest of
the defendant shall issue to any officer authorized by law to execute it.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(a).
78. E.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411,415 (1976) (stating that 18 U.S.C.
§ 3061 "represents a judgment by Congress that it is not unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment for postal inspectors to arrest without a warrant provided they have probable
cause to do so"); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964) (noting that the validity of Beck's
arrest, where the officers had no arrest warrant, depended on whether the officers had
probable cause to make such an arrest); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 309-10,
314 (1959) (explaining that because a federal narcotic agent had probable cause under
the Fourth Amendment and reasonable grounds under section 104(a) of the Narcotic
Control Act of 1956 to believe that Draper had committed a violation of narcotics laws,
Draper's arrest "was therefore lawful").
19. Draper, 358 U.S. at 313 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162
(1925)).
80. Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969). Following an arrest, a
police officer may search the arrestee and the area "'within his immediate control"' to
remove any weapons and seize any evidence in the arrestee's possession to prevent its
destruction. Id. at 763.
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IV. THE LAW AS IT PERTAINS TO SEARCHES

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states: "The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated." 81 Writing for the majority in Katz v. United States, 82 Justice
Stewart, in determining when a search occurs, wrote: "What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected."83
Justice Harlan, writing a concurring opinion, hung the question of
what constitutes a search on a privacy rung. 84 He stated: "[A] person has
a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy." 85 A
reasonable expectation of privacy is based on a "twofold requirement,
first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared
to recognize as 'reasonable. "'86 Thus, to implicate the Fourth
Amendment, the Sniffer must be found to infringe upon a driver's
reasonable expectation of privacy which, in tum, is based upon the
existence of a subjective expectation of privacy that society deems
legitimate. If the Sniffer's operation constitutes a search, then a further
inquiry of whether such a search may be unreasonable is required.
At the outset of the Fourth Amendment analysis, the question stands
whether the Sniffer's operation can be said to constitute a search. With
its dual capabilities, that of a flashlight and an alcohol sensor, 87 the
answer is perhaps not immediately apparent. This Part will first explore
the law surrounding the use of flashlights and then look at how breath
alcohol screening instruments square with search law before attempting
81. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
82. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
83. Id. at 348, 351-52 (citations omitted). In Katz, the Court found the electronic
monitoring of the defendant's conversations constituted a search. Although the defendant
could be seen inside the phone booth, what he sought to preserve as private was his
conversation, which he did by shutting the door to the booth. See id. at 352-53.
84. Id. at 360. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965), the Court
found a right of privacy to exist within the penumbras of the specific guarantees of the
Bill of Rights. The Court noted that "the Fourth Amendment ... creat[es] a 'right to
privacy, no less important than any other right carefully and particularly reserved to the
people."' Id. at 485 (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961)). Writing for the
dissent in Schmerber v. Califomia, 384 U.S. 757, 778-79 (1966), Justice Douglas wrote,
"the Fourth Amendment recognizes that right [of privacy] when it guarantees the right of
the people to be secure 'in their persons."'
85. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360.
86. Id. at 361.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
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to predict where the Sniffer, which is, in effect, a combination of the
two, will come out.
A. Flashlights

Assuming a car is first lawfully stopped,88 a police officer's
subsequent use of a flashlight to illuminate the interior of the vehicle has
been consistently upheld as a nonsearch under the Fourth Amendment.89 In
Texas v. Brown, 90 an officer stopped respondent Brown's vehicle during
a routine driver's license checkpoint. The officer asked Brown for his
license and shined his flashlight into the car whereupon he observed
Brown remove his hand from his pocket with a green balloon wrapped
between his two fingers. 91 Brown dropped the balloon onto his seat and
reached across to open the glove compartment, at which point the officer
"shifted his position in order to obtain a better view of the interior of the
glove compartment."92 Reversing the judgment of the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals, the Supreme Court stated:

88. A driver who has been pulled over by a police officer has been "seized" within
the meaning of Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968) (stating that a seizure takes
place when the officer "by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some
way restrained the liberty of a citizen"); see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653
(1979) (explaining that "stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitutes a
'seizure' within the meaning of [the Fourth Amendment], even though the purpose of the
stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief'). Because a vehicle stop
constitutes a seizure, it must not be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Whren
v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996). Such a seizure can be reasonable and
therefore lawful when based on probable cause or the lesser standard of reasonable
suspicion. See supra Part III.A.
89. E.g., United States v. Booker, 461 F.2d 990, 992 (6th Cir. 1972) (stating that
"[f]lashing the flashlight in the rear of the car did not constitute a search of the car");
United States v. Kim, 430 F.2d 58, 61 (9th Cir. 1970) ("[The officer] flashed his
flashlight into the car, which he had a right to do for his own protection if for no other
reason. Such conduct does not constitute a search.") (citation omitted); State v. Lamp,
322 N.W.2d 48, 52 (Iowa 1982) (explaining that the use of artificial light to "illuminate
articles that would be readily visible in daylight" does not render invalid the observation
of items in plain view inside a vehicle, and thus does not constitute a search); State v.
Shevchuk, 191 N.W.2d 557, 558-59 (Minn. 1971) (holding an officer's observation ofa
firearm in plain sight in defendant's automobile, where the officer shined his flashlight
into the vehicle, was not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
90. 460 U.S. 730 (1983).
91. Id. at 733.
92. Id. at 733-34.
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It is . . . beyond dispute that [the officer's] action in shining his flashlight to
illuminate the interior of Brown's car trenched upon no right secured to the
latter by the Fourth Amendment. The Court said in United States v. Lee: "[The]
use of a searchlight is comparable to the use of a marine glass or a field glass. It
is not prohibited by the Constitution." Numerous other courts have agreed that
the use of artificial means to illuminate a darkened area simply does not
constitute a search, and thus triggers no Fourth Amendment protection.93

Moreover, whatever officers may discover by utilizing a flashlight to
illuminate the inside of the vehicle is said to fall within the plain view
doctrine. 94 In United States v. Johnson, 95 officers stopped a vehicle for
running a stop sign. 96 One officer shined a flashlight into the vehicle to
perform an inventory search after arresting the driver on an outstanding
warrant. A sawed-off shotgun appeared to be lodged between the
cushions of the back seat and the officer seized it. 97 Applying the plain
view doctrine, the eighth circuit upheld the district court's denial of the
driver's motion to suppress the shotgun as having been retrieved
pursuant to a warrantless search of the vehicle. 98 The court said: "Under
the 'plain view' doctrine, a plain view observation made by a police
officer from a position where the officer is entitled to be is not a 'search'
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Consequently, the
restrictions of the Fourth Amendment are not applicable." 99 The court
reasoned that the officer had a right to be in a position to view the inside
of the vehicle because of the traffic stop and upheld his use of the
flashlight. 100 The court stated: "The fact that the contents of the vehicle
may not have been visible without the use of artificial illumination does
93. Id. at 739--40 (citation omitted). Wayne R. LaFave offers the following
explanation for why courts treat the use of a flashlight as a nonsearch: "[T]he owner or
operator of an automobile parked or being operated upon a public thoroughfare does not
have a justified expectation that such a common device as a flashlight would not be used
during the nighttime to see what would be visible without such illumination during
daylight hours." WAYNER. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE§ 2.2(b) (3d ed. 1996).
94. E.g., United States v. Landry, 903 F.2d 334, 337 (5th Cir. 1990) ("After Polk
got out of the truck, Officer Roy shined his flashlight into the cab of the truck and
discovered the money which was in plain view. His use of the flashlight to aid his vision
did not transform an otherwise valid plain view observation into an illegal search.");
United States v. Hood, 493 F.2d 677, 680 (9th Cir. 1974) ("An officer shined his
flashlight in the car and saw vials of pills in plain view in Mrs. Hood's open purse. His
use of the flashlight did not constitute a search and what he saw was encompassed within
the plain view doctrine."): Booker, 461 F.2d at 992 ("Since it would not constitute a
search for the officer to observe objects in plain view in the automobile in daylight, it
ought not to constitute a search for him to flash a light in the car as he was walking past
it in the night season.").
95. 506 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1974).
96. Id. at 675.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 676.
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not preclude such observation from application of the 'plain view'
doctrine." 101
By illuminating the inside of a vehicle, the case law makes clear that
the Sniffer, as a flashlight, is not performing any search proscribed by
the Fourth Amendment. Any objects of an apparently criminal nature
would presumably be subject to seizure under the plain view doctrine as
if the officer were using a plain flashlight with no alcohol-sensing
capabilities. When the beam of the Sniffer's flashlight is turned on, the
driver, at this point, has no Fourth Amendment shield to raise; the
necessity for its protections has yet to come into play.
B. Breath Alcohol Screening Instruments

Once the driver is asked to speak so that the Sniffer's alcohol sensor
may sample his breath and provide the officer with an approximate
BAC, the landscape begins to change. Laying the foundation for the law
as it pertains to governmental intrusions into the human body, in
Schmerber v. California, the Supreme Court held that a compulsory
blood test constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment. 102
Following an automobile accident, the petitioner was arrested at a
hospital for driving under the influence of alcohol because based on the
petitioner's "symptoms of drunkenness" both at the scene and at the
hospital, "there was plainly probable cause for the officer to arrest
petitioner." 103 The officer ordered a physician to take a blood sample
despite the petitioner's refusal, and subsequent chemical testing of the
sample revealed intoxication. The results of this testing were later used
at trial. 104
In addressing the petitioner's argument that the blood test transgressed
his right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures under the
Fourth Amendment, the Court noted that blood tests "plainly constitute
IOI. Id.; see also Marshall v. United States, 422 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1970).
When the circumstances of a particular case are such that the police officer's
observation would not have constituted a search had it occurred in daylight,
then the fact that the officer used a flashlight to pierce the nighttime darkness
does not transform his observation into a search. Regardless of the time of day
or night, the plain view rule must be upheld where the viewer is rightfully
positioned . . . . The plain view rule does not go into hibernation at sunset.
Id. at 189.
102. 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
103. Id. at 768--69.
104. Id. at 758-59.
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searches of 'persons,' and depend antecedently upon seizures of
'persons,' within the meaning of that Amendment." 105 The Court, in its
analysis, undertook a dual inquiry of "whether the police were justified
in requiring petitioner to submit to the blood test, and whether the means
and procedures employed in taking his blood respected relevant Fourth
Amendment standards of reasonableness." 106 As to the first question,
the Court, commenting on "searches involving intrusions beyond the
body's surface," 107 stated:
The interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment
protects forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance that desired evidence
might be obtained. In the absence of a clear indication that in fact such
evidence will be found, these fundamental human interests require law officers
to suffer the risk that such evidence may disappear unless there is an immediate
search. 108

Here, the Court said that the facts supporting the probable cause
determination "suggested the required relevance and likely success of a
test of petitioner's blood for alcohol." 109 The officer was not required to
obtain a search warrant prior to requesting the administration of the
blood test due to the exigencies of the situation; the delay in doing so
might have "threatened 'the destruction of evidence."' 110 The Court
upheld the blood test as a valid search incident to petitioner's lawful
arrest; 111 no Fourth Amendment violation was found to exist. 112
Subsequent to the Schmerber decision, the Supreme Court similarly
determined Breathalyzer tests to constitute searches within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Ass'n. 113
The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) adopted
regulations that authorized breath and urine tests of employees who
105. Id. at 767.
106. Id. at 768.
107. Id. at 769.
108. Id. at 769-70.
I 09. Id. at 770.
I 10. Id. (quoting Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964)). The Court
stated: "We are told that the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly
after drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate it from the system." Id. Because
of the time required in this particular case to bring the petitioner to the hospital, "there
was no time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant." Id. at 771.
111. Id. As to the second inquiry, the Court said the blood test was a reasonable
way of ascertaining the petitioner's BAC and the actual test was administered
reasonably. Id.
112. Id. at 772. The Court made a point of noting the narrowness of its holding to
the facts of this case. The Court stated: "That we today hold that the Constitution does
not forbid the States minor intrusions into an individual's body under stringently limited
conditions in no way indicates that it permits more substantial intrusions, or intrusions
under other conditions." Id.
113. 489 U.S. 602, 616-17 (1989).
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violated safety rules and mandated blood and urine tests of employees
involved in certain train accidents. 114 The issue before the Court was
whether these regulations were in contravention of the Fourth
Amendment. As an initial matter, the Court assessed whether the
various tests constituted searches or seizures before conducting a
reasonableness inquiry. 115 The Court stated:
We have long recognized that a "compelled intrusio[n] into the body for blood
to be analyzed for alcohol content" must be deemed a Fourth Amendment
search. In light of our society's concern for the security of one's person, it is
obvious that this physical intrusion, penetrating beneath the skin, infringes an
expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. The
ensuing chemical analysis of the sample to obtain physiological data is a further
invasion of the tested employee's privacy interests. Much the same is true of
the breath-testing procedures . . . . Subjecting a person to a [B] reathalyzer test,
which generally requires the production of alveolar or "deep lung" breath for
chemical analysis, implicates similar concerns about bodily integrity and, like
the blood-alcohol test we considered in Schmerber, should also be deemed a
search. 116

C. The Sniffer

For Fourth Amendment purposes, the Sniffer's alcohol-sensing device
is functionally equivalent to a Breathalyzer test. A Breathalyzer requires
a person to blow into the device and provides an officer with a BAC. 117
The Sniffer's alcohol sensor analyzes a breath sample and provides the
officer with an approximate BAC. 118 Some posit that what the Sniffer
does is justified by the plain view doctrine, and therefore argue that it is
not necessary to reach a conclusion as to whether the Sniffer is
performing a search. The driver's breath is in plain view of the officer
who has a right to be in a position to view that breath, assuming the stop
of the vehicle is lawful. The breath is, therefore, subject to seizure under
the plain view doctrine and no search of the person transpires.
The plain view doctrine is an exception to the warrant requirement
114. Id. at 606.
115. Id. at 614.
116. Id. at 616-17 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see
also Commonwealth v. Quarles, 324 A.2d 452,460 n.4 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974) (explaining
that the "Commonwealth treats the administration of a breathalyzer test as a search and
seizure" because there is a seizure of air and "the material seized comes from within the
suspect's body'').
117. See Gil Sapir & Mark Giangrande, Right to Inspect and Test Breath Alcohol
Machines: Suspicion Ain't Proof, 33 J. MARSHALLL. REv. 1, 3-4 (1999).
118. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
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that justifies seizures of "evidence incriminating the accused," where the
police officer has "a prior justification for [the] intrusion" that brings the
officer within fc1ain view of the item(s) to be seized. 119 In Harris v.
United States, 1 0 the Court stated: "It has long been settled that objects
falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced
in evidence." 121 Application of the plain view doctrine depends upon the
following three factors: first, the officer must lawfully be in a position to
view the object subject to seizure; second, the officer must have a lawful
right of access to the object itself; and third, the incriminating character
of the object in plain view must be '"immediately apparent"' to the
officer. 122 Where these three factors are satisfied, the police officer may
validly seize the incriminating evidence without a warrant. 123
An officer who lawfully stops a vehicle based on probable cause or
reasonable suspicion will lawfully be in a position to view an object in
plain view inside a vehicle. 124 Likewise, the officer will have a lawful
right of access to the object itself. As to the third prong, that the
incriminating character of the object be immediately apparent to the
officer, the Court in Texas v. Brown 125 explained that immediately
apparent means only that the officer has probable cause to believe the
object in plain view is evidence of a crime. 126 While an officer cannot
see breath and determine that it is likely incriminatory due to alcohol
consumption, the officer certainly may smell alcohol in a driver's breath,
thus giving rise to probable cause to believe the driver is intoxicated.
119. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-66 (1971). "The doctrine
serves to supplement the prior justification-whether it be a warrant for another object,
hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being
present unconnected with a search directed against the accused-and permits the
warrantless seizure." Id. at 466.
120. 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
121. Id. at 236 (emphasis added).
122. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1990). In Horton, the Court
stated:
It is, of course, an essential predicate to any valid warrantless seizure of
incriminating evidence that the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment
in arriving at the place from which the evidence could be plainly viewed.
There are, moreover, two additional conditions that must be satisfied to justify
the warrantless seizure. First, not only must the item be in plain view, its
incriminating character must also be "immediately apparent." ... Second, not
only must the officer be lawfully located in a place from which the object can
be plainly seen, but he or she must also have a lawful right of access to the
object itself.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730,466 (1983)).
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 506 F.2d 674,676 (8th Cir. 1974).
125. 460 U.S. 730 (1983).
126. Id. at 741-42.
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In United States v. Martinez-Miramontes, 127 a customs agent
approached a vehicle on the roadside abandoned by two individuals and
sniffed around the trunk which was "hanging pretty low." 128 He
detected the odor of marijuana. 129 The ninth circuit disagreed with the
appellant that the agent's act of sniffing around the trunk constituted a
search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 130 The court said: "We
find no distinction of substance between leaning down and turning the
head to look inside a motor vehicle to see articles which then come
within the 'plain view' doctrine, and leaning down and sniffing to detect
the odor of marijuana." 131 The court concluded that no Fourth
Amendment intrusion took place because the agent, "[b]y the use of [his]
ordinary senses while standing in a place where [he] had a right to be
standing," was allowed to "detect the nature" of whatever was contained
inside the trunk. 132 Martinez-Miramontes was subsequently cited with
approval by the court in United States v. Pagdn 133 as "very persuasive on
the point of the extension of the 'plain view' doctrine to the use of other
senses to establish probable cause." 134 The court continued: "No longer
is an officer restricted to seizing evidence that is in 'plain view.' Now
the doctrine has been expanded to cover that evidence that can be
perceived by the sense of smell." 135
·
Accepting this extension of the plain view doctrine, an officer who
smells alcohol on a driver's breath will satisfy the third prong of the
plain view doctrine because the officer could establish probable cause to
believe the driver is under the influence of alcohol. Having satisfied the
three requirements of the plain view doctrine by the use of olfactory
senses, the officer can seize that breath without a warrant, meaning the
officer can use the information he picks up by smelling alcohol as part of
his overall probable cause determination to possibly make an arrest for
drunk driving. Smelling the alcoholic breath in plain view of the officer
127. 494 F.2d 808 (9th Cir. 1974).
128. Id. at 809.
129. Id. at 809-10.
130. Id. at 810.
131. Id. (citation omitted).
132. Id.
133. 395 F. Supp. 1052 (D.P.R. 1975).
134. Id. at 1060.
135. Id. at 1060-61; see also United States v. Pierre, 958 F.2d 1304, 1310 (5th Cir.
1992) ("[Border Patrol Agent] Hillin was lawfully within the car when he smelled the
burned marijuana. Thus, the evidence falls within the plain view (or plain smell)
exception to the warrant or probable cause requirement").
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gives the officer probable cause at this point in the detention, depending
on what other factors have already transpired, to arrest the driver, or at
least it gives the officer a reasonable suspicion to conduct further
inquiries, such as requiring the driver to perform field sobriety tests. 136
The seizure of the breath, however, does not justify a subsequent search of
the breath by the Sniffer's alcohol sensor, absent consent on the part of the
driver. 137 The driver's breath is sucked into the alcohol sensor, put
through a chemical analysis, and then the sensor provides the officer with
information about the driver's BAC. The driver is therefore subjected to a
search; the Sniffer is performing a search of the driver, apart from the
officer's own ability to smell for the presence of alcohol. 138
V. THE REASONABLENESS INQUIRY
If the argument is accepted that, based on Skinner, 139 the Sniffer is
performing a search of the person within the meaning of the Fourth
136. The officer need only have a reasonable suspicion of intoxication to require a
lawfully detained driver to submit to field sobriety tests. E.g., Kinberg v. District of
Columbia, No. 94-2516 (PLF), 1998 WL 10364, at *28 (D.D.C. Jan. 5, 1998), a.ff'd sub
nom. Rogala v. District of Columbia, 161 F.3d 44 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
137. One might argue that exhaled breath is abandoned property and therefore is not
protected under the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment does not protect
abandoned property. Edward G. Mascolo, The Role of Abandonment in the Law of
Search and Seizure: An Application of Misdirected Emphasis, 20 BUFF. L. REV. 399,
400-01 (1970) ("In short, the theory of abandonment is that no issue of search is
presented in such a situation, and the property so abandoned may be seized without
probable cause."). This argument, however, is unpersuasive. In City of St. Paul v.
Vaughn, 237 N.W.2d 365, 371 (Minn. 1975), the court explained that in the context of
search and seizure, the question of abandonment is whether the defendant has
"relinquished his reasonable expectation of privacy" in the discarded property "so that its
seizure and search is reasonable within the limits of the Fourth Amendment. . . . [Wlhat
is abandoned is not necessarily the defendant's property, but his reasonable expectation
of privacy therein." A driver's breath, exhaled from the body as the driver speaks to the
officer does not constitute abandoned property because the driver certainly maintains a
reasonable expectation of privacy in it, insofar as it has the capacity to reveal the driver's
BAC. Furthermore, considering the driver has no choice but to exhale as part of the
normal function of his respiratory system, application of the abandoned property doctrine
in this context is inherently unfair.
138. In June of 2001, the Supreme Court held that the use of thermal imaging
devices to measure heat emissions from private homes constitutes a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment and is thus presumptively unreasonable without a
warrant. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29, 40 (2001). Justice Scalia, writing for
the majority, stated: "We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any
information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been
obtained without physical 'intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,' constitutes a
search-at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use."
Id. at 34 (citation omitted) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512
(1961)). By analogy, the Sniffer is obtaining information regarding the interior of a
person-the BAC of a person's breath-and hence can be said to constitute a search.
139. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
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Amendment, then that Amendment's protections are implicated and
further analysis is required. Because "what the Constitution forbids is
not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures," 140
the fate of the Sniffer falls upon a reasonableness inquiry. The Court in
Delaware v. Prouse 141 stated: ''The essential purpose of the proscriptions
in the Fourth Amendment is to impose a standard of 'reasonableness'
upon the exercise of discretion by government officials, including law
enforcement agents, in order 'to safeguard the privacy and security of
individuals against arbitrary invasions."' 142 The Court continued: "Thus,
the permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by
balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests
against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests." 143 Citing the
Prouse balancing test as the standard for assessing the reasonableness of
a governmental search, the Court in Vernonia School District 47J v.
Acton144 broke the reasonableness test up into the following three
factors: first, "the nature of the privacy interest upon which the search
here at issue intrudes"; 145 second, "the character of the intrusion that is
complained of'; 146 and third, "the nature and immediacy of the
governmental concern at issue here, and the efficacy of this means for
meeting it." 147
A. The Privacy Interest

As to the first factor, the Vernonia Court explained that the Fourth
Amendment only protects subjective expectations of privacy that "society
recognizes as 'legitimate."' 148 Furthermore, "[w]hat expectations are
140. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206, 222 (1960)). "[T]he central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment [is] the
reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a
citizen's personal security." Id. at 19.
141. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
142. Id. at 653-54 (quoting Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307,312 (1978)).
143. Id. at 654; see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 ("[T]here is 'no ready test for
determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against
the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails."' (alterations in original) (quoting
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967))).
144. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
145. Id. at 653-54.
146. Id. at 658.
147. Id. at 660.
148. Id. at 654 (citations omitted) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,338
(1985)).
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legitimate varies, of course, with context, depending, for example, upon
whether the individual asserting the privacy interest is at home, at work,
in a car, or in a public park." 149 Quite obviously, the individuals asserting
the privacy interest at issue here-the drivers being subjected to a
Sniffer search-are in cars. Drivers and passengers alike, the Supreme
Court has pointed out, have "a reduced expectation of privacy" inside a
vehicle. 150 Yet the justification for this reduced expectation of privacy
has no logical bearing on a driver's privacy expectation in his or her
breath. As the Court noted in Robbins v. California, 151 the reduced
expectation of privacy that inheres in a vehicle "arises from the facts that
a car is used for transportation and not as a residence or a repository of
personal effects, that a car's occupants and contents travel in plain view,
and that automobiles are necessarily highly regulated by government." 152
A driver's breath cannot seriously be taken to constitute "content" in
plain view or a "personal effect" inside a vehicle within the meaning
likely intended by the Court. 153 Moreover, the Court already decided in
Skinner that a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy with regard
to intrusions into the body for breath. 154
Indeed, classifying
Breathalyzers as searches within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
in Skinner necessarily required the Court, in light of Katz, 155 to recognize
that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her breath.
This reasonable expectation of privacy would be based on a person's
actual subjective expectation of privacy which is objectively reasonable. 156
Thus, the first prong of the reasonableness inquiry can be satisfied-a
driver has a subjective, legitimate, expectation of privacy in his or her
breath as far as it reveals information about the state of the driver's
body, regardless of whether the individual is sitting in a vehicle or
walking down the street.

149. Id. (citations omitted).
150. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303 (1999) (noting that drivers and
passengers have a "reduced expectation of privacy with regard to the property that they
transport in cars" given that cars use public roadways, are subject to be stopped and
examined by law enforcement officials, aren't intended to be warehouses for personal
belongings, and are "exposed to traffic accidents that may render all their contents open
to public scrutiny").
151. 453 U.S. 420 (1981).
152. Id. at 424.
153. Breath is not like an umbrella, a sawed-off shotgun, or drug paraphernalia
thrown on the floor of a car.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 113-16.
155. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
156. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
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B. The Character of the Intrusion
Turning to the second prong, the "character of the intrusion that is
complained of," merely requiring the driver to talk for a few seconds to
generate the breath sample presents no apparent hardship or risk of
embarrassment. Furthermore, use of the Sniffer may very well prevent
an officer from making an arrest he would otherwise have made in the
absence of the information provided by the instrument by dispelling a
suspicion of intoxication. Perhaps most noteworthy is the fact that the
Sniffer's approximate BAC reading is not admissible evidence in
court. 157 As such, the Sniffer is not providing information of an
evidential nature to be used against the driver in a criminal proceeding;
rather, the Sniffer's reading is meant only to provide the officer with
another factor to consider in the officer's overall assessment of whether
probable cause exists to arrest the driver for drunk driving. 158 The
intrusion, in the sense that the officer has knowledge of the driver's
BAC, does not appear so jarring when due recognition is given to the
fact that the Sniffer' s results cannot be used in court. 159
157. That is, at least according to its maker, PAS Systems International. The Web
site provides, "[The Sniffer] is not an evidential test and its results should not be
presented as such." PAS Systems International, P.A.S. III Sniffer, at http://www.
sniffalcohol.com/prod0I.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2002).
158. Somewhat pertaining to the touted inadmissibility of the Sniffer's results is
Volk v. United States, 51 F. Supp. 2d 888 (N.D. Cal. 1999), where an officer, upon
stopping a driver for a traffic violation and subsequently detecting the odor of alcohol on
the driver's breath, administered a series of field sobriety tests, the last of which was a
"preliminary alcohol screen test." Id. at 890-91. This test required the driver to blow
into a small device that provided the officer with a reading of the driver's estimated
blood alcohol. The specific results of the preliminary alcohol screen test were not
introduced at the driver's consequent trial on charges of driving under the influence of
alcohol; however, the officer who performed the field sobriety testing did testify that the
reading confirmed that the driver had consumed alcohol. Id. at 891. The preliminary
alcohol screen test differs from the Sniffer in that the driver has knowledge that his or
her breath is being tested to ascertain a blood alcohol level; the hallmark of the Sniffer is
that it provides the officer with an approximate BAC without the driver's knowledge.
Nevertheless, it is foreseeable that although officers may not testify at trial to the specific
numerical reading provided by the Sniffer, they may testify, as in Volk, that the Sniffer
confirmed their suspicions of intoxication. Such a statement likely has the same
incriminating effect as does testimony of the specific number produced by the Sniffer.
The intrusion, therefore, may not be so minimal where the Sniffer's operation can affect
the results of a trial and not just serve to aid solely the officer in assessing probable cause
to arrest.
159. Presumably, the makers had in mind that once the officer had probable cause
to arrest the driver and did in fact arrest the driver, the officer could then administer a
Breathalyzer or some other test for BAC pursuant to the state's implied consent law, the
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Yet, the Sniffer is still revealing private information to the police
officer about the state of the driver's body, namely, the driver's approximate
BAC. This information is being revealed without the driver's knowledge or
consent to be tested and inform the officer of the driver's BAC.
Moreover, officers have discretion to tap the power switch on the
flashlight that triggers the breath analysis of every driver they pull over,
regardless of whether suspicion of alcohol consumption was a factor
justifying the stop.
Furthermore, the surreptitious manner in which the Sniffer operates
obviates any opportunity on the driver's part to refuse to be subject to
such testing. The Sniffer has the effect of bypassing state implied
consent laws which authorize police to administer Breathalyzers only
after making an arrest. 160 Even implied consent laws provide the driver
with the option of refusing to take the Breathalyzer test, although the
driver will be faced with possible license suspension and like
sanctions. 161 The intrusion into a driver's privacy is greater in a situation
where the Sniffer is used as compared to a situation where it is not and
the implied consent law is followed.
As to the latter scenario, the officer has to acquire probable cause to
make an arrest for drunk driving, presumably using his own observations
and field sobriety tests. Once the officer has made the arrest, only then
may the officer request the arrested driver to submit to a Breathalyzer
test. The driver may refuse to take the test.
In the Sniffer situation, on the other hand, the officer is able to
conduct a search and collect an approximate BAC as part of the officer's
probable cause determination, before any arrest is made. The officer
perhaps is able to make an arrest where he might not have without the
aid of the Sniffer because the approximate BAC provided can bolster the
probable cause determination. Of course, the officer still needs to take a
results of which are admissible in court.
160. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.1932 (West 2001). Section 316.1932(l)(a)
provides that a driver in the state is deemed to have given consent to submit to a
chemical or physical test to determine blood alcohol content "if the person is lawfully
arrested for any offense allegedly committed while the person was driving or was in
actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic
beverages." Id. Section 316.1932(1)(a) further states: "The chemical or physical breath
test must be incidental to a lawful arrest and administered at the request of a law
enforcement officer who has reasonable cause to believe such person was driving ...
while under the influence of alcoholic beverages." Id.; see also MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN.§ 257.625c (West 2001).
161. For Example, section 316.1932(1)(a) states that the arrestee must be informed
that the "failure to submit to any lawful test of his or her breath ... will result in the
suspension of the person's privilege to operate a motor vehicle for a period of l year."
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.1932(l)(a). Furthermore, "[t]he refusal to submit to a chemical
or physical breath test ... is admissible into evidence in any criminal proceeding." Id.
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postarrest Breathalyzer reading to have admissible evidence in court,
because the Sniffer's results are not admissible. So the driver in the
Sniffer situation is searched twice. Even if the drivers in both situations
refuse to submit to the postarrest breath tests, the driver's BAC in the
Sniffer situation is at least already made known to the officer. 162
In those states where the implied consent laws do not require an arrest
before a Breathalyzer test may be administered, 163 the need to use the
Sniffer may be obviated if the police officer can administer a Breathalyzer
test anyway. Pennsylvania, for example, requires the officer to have
reasonable grounds before administering a breath test. 164 Under such
circumstances, the argument can be made that using the Sniffer may aid
the officer in forming the requisite reasonable grounds to administer the
breath test. This argument, however, overlooks the fact that the Sniffer
is still performing a search of the driver.
PAS Systems International, Inc., the Sniffer's maker, posits on its
Web site that the Sniffer's purpose is to help the officer "formulate
probable cause without the subject's active involvement." 165 Presumptively,
the hope is that the officer, having utilized the Sniffer to garner probable
cause, now may lawfully arrest the driver if the BAC reading indicates
the appropriateness of so doing. If the argument is accepted, however,
that the Sniffer performs a search of the driver, then the situation
becomes one where the officer is performing a search to gather evidence
to justify a subsequent arrest of the driver. That is, the officer is
conducting a search to gather probable cause to make an arrest. This
series of events is somewhat backwards from the typical "search incident
to arrest" scenario where the officer, already armed with Erobable cause,
makes an arrest and then searches incident to that arrest. 1 6
162. Moreover, even if both drivers refuse to submit to postarrest breath tests, for
the driver in the Sniffer situation, the officer could still testify at trial that the reading
provided by the Sniffer confirmed the consumption of alcohol, even though the officer
does not testify to the specific number provided. See discussion supra note 158.
163. E.g., 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1547 (West 1996 & Supp. 2001). Section
1547(a) provides that any person driving in the state is deemed to have given consent to
a chemical test of breath to determine blood alcohol content "if a police officer has
reasonable grounds to believe the person to have been driving, operating or in actual
physical control of the movement of a motor vehicle: ... while under the influence of
alcohol." Id. In Commonwealth v. Quarles, 324 A2d 452, 466 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974),
the court construed "reasonable grounds" to mean "probable cause."
164. See discussion supra note 163.
165. PAS Systems International, Inc., P.A.S. III Sniffer, at http://www.sniffalcohol.
com/prod0l.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2002).
166. Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Following an arrest, a police
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The Court, in Sibron v. New York, 167 stated: "It is axiomatic that an
incident search may not precede an arrest and serve as part of its
justification." 168 Further expanding on this principle, Justice Harlan,
concurring in the case, wrote:
Of course, the fruits of a search may not be used to justify an arrest to which it
is incident, but this means only that probable cause to arrest must precede the
search. If the prosecution shows probable cause to arrest prior to a search of a
man's person, it has met its total burden. There is no case in which a defendant
may validly say, "Although the officer had a right to arrest me at the moment
when he seized me and searched my person, the search is invalid because he did
not in fact arrest me until afterwards." 169

Sibron, therefore, helps to shape the following conclusions: if the
officer has no probable cause to make an arrest prior to using the Sniffer,
then the officer will be executing an impermissible incident search in
subsequently utilizing the Sniffer to gather the requisite probable cause
to justify an arrest; if, however, the officer has probable cause to make
an arrest for drunk driving prior to using the Sniffer, then the search,
assuming it is reasonableness, could be justified as incident to a lawful
arrest, even if the arrest is not made until after the search is conducted. 170
C. The Governmental Interests

Finally, the third prong of the reasonableness inquiry considers the
"nature and immediacy of the governmental concern at issue here, and

officer may search the arrestee and the area "within his immediate control" to remove
any weapons and seize any evidence in the arrestee's possession to prevent its
destruction. Id. at 762-63.
167. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
168. Id. at 63. In Sibron, a police officer observed Sibron conversing with six or
eight persons whom the officer knew to be narcotics addicts over the course of an eighthour period. The officer did not overhear any part of the conversations nor did he see
anything pass between Sibron and the other persons. Sibron was later observed talking
with three more addicts inside a restaurant. The officer went into the restaurant and told
Sibron to come outside whereupon the officer reached into Sibron's pocket and
discovered glassine envelopes containing heroin. At a hearing for a motion to suppress,
the prosecution argued that the officer had probable cause to believe that Sibron had
narcotics on him because he had been seen talking with known addicts over the course of
eight hours. Id. at 45-47. The Supreme Court stated that the heroin was clearly
inadmissible against Sibron: "Nothing resembling probable cause existed until after the
search had turned up the envelopes of heroin. . . . Thus the search cannot be justified as
incident to a lawful arrest." Id. at 62-63 (citations omitted).
169. Id. at 77.
170. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 & n.6 (1980) ("Where the formal
arrest followed quickly on the heels of the challenged search of petitioner's person, we
do not believe it particularly important that the search preceded the arrest rather than vice
versa" where "[t]he fruits of the search of petitioner's person were, of course, not
necessary to support probable cause to arrest petitioner.").
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the efficacy of this means for meeting it." 171 Without question, drunk
driving poses a serious concern to the entire nation. Indeed, as the Court
recognized in South Dakota v. Neville: 172 "The situation underlying this
case-that of the drunk driver--occurs with tragic frequency on our
Nation's highways. The carnage caused by drunk drivers is well
documented .... This Court ... has repeatedly lamented the tragedy." 173
Efforts to reduce the devastating and tragic consequences of drunk
driving certainly should be applauded and encouraged. The nature of the
government's concern-reducing alcohol related accidents and fatalities
and making the roadways safer for all drivers-is of paramount
importance. The immediacy of the concern is no less striking; the
statistical data attesting to over 15,000 deaths in both 1998 and 1999,
and over 16,000 deaths in 2000, is cause for alarm. President Clinton's
signing into law a national standard that declares all drivers to be
considered drunk at a BAC of .08 further speaks to the magnitude of the
interest in ameliorating safety on the roadways.
On the one hand, the argument stands that drunk driving is an acute
problem in which the public has a legitimate, vested interest in seeing
eradicated; if the Sniffer can help ferret out drunk drivers and get them
off the road, then the balance must be tipped in the public's favor. The
only catch is that constitutional protections must not be thrown out the
window, even for a laudable cause. 174 While mitigating the tragedy of
171. Verononica Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,660 (1995).
172. 459 U.S. 553 (1983).
173. Id. at 558.
174. See Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,459 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("[C]onsensus that a particular law enforcement technique serves a laudable
purpose has never been the touchstone of constitutional analysis."); see also New Jersey
v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). In T.L.O., Justice Brennan stated:
The Fourth Amendment was designed not merely to protect against official
intrusions whose social utility was less as measured by some "balancing test"
than its intrusion on individual privacy; it was designed in addition to grant the
individual a zone of privacy whose protections could be breached only where
the "reasonable" requirements of the probable-cause standard were met.
Moved by whatever momentary evil has aroused their fears, officials-perhaps
even supported by a majority of citizens-may be tempted to conduct searches
that sacrifice the liberty of each citizen to assuage the perceived evil. But the
Fourth Amendment rests on the principle that a true balance between the
individual and society depends on the recognition of "the right to be let
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men."
Id. at 361-62 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnote omitted)
(quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
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drunk driving is a shared national interest, the efficacy of the Sniffer as a
means to achieve this goal must not transgress the constitutional
protections residing in the Fourth Amendment.
The pressing need for the Sniffer may be questionable in light of
already existing testing procedures for routing out drunk drivers. Apart
from the officer's own sensory perceptions of the driver, 175 field sobriety
tests can be used to aid the probable cause assessment prior to making an
arrest for drunk driving. 176 In Kinberg v. District of Columbia, 177 a
police officer, having lawfully stopped a vehicle for running a red light,
ordered the driver out of the car for a field sobriety test after observing
the driver's "glossy" eyes and "bloated" face. 178 The United States
District Court for the District of Columbia addressed the issue of what
"level of suspicion [is] required for the detention of a lawfully stopped

175. "The most important test for determining intoxication or degree of intoxication
has always been the subjective conclusion of the person making the determination based
upon the clinical symptoms." L. Poindexter Watts, Some Observations on PoliceAdministered Tests for Intoxication, 45 N.C. L. REv. 34, 41 (1966-1967). In a footnote,
Watts states that '"clinical symptoms' is a phrase widely used in chemical-testing circles
to indicate symptoms of intoxication that could be detected simply by careful
observation." Id. at n.21.
176. See Stone v. City of Huntsville, 656 So. 2d 404,409 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994).
[A] stop of a motorist whom an officer reasonably suspects of driving under
the influence of alcohol or drugs is no different from a Terry stop. Once the
stop is effected, the detaining officer may, as part of the "moderate number of
questions" asked of the motorist, request the motorist "to perform a simple
balancing test," to recite the alphabet, and/or to perform a balancing exercise
while counting aloud. If the officer's suspicions are dispelled during the brief
detention and questioning, he must release the motorist. If the officer's
suspicions are confirmed, he may charge the motorist with driving under the
influence ....
Id. (citations omitted) (footnote omitted) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420,
442 (1984)). "The law enforcement interest that the [field sobriety] tests serve is to help
a police officer assess promptly the likelihood that a driver is intoxicated and to provide
him with a reliable basis for making an arrest ... thereby preventing the driver from
potentially killing or maiming himself or others." State v. Little, 468 A.2d 615, 617
(Me. 1983). "The field sobriety tests are designed and administered to avoid the
shortcomings of casual observation .... Thus they broaden the officer's observation of
the defendant and enhance the basis and reliability of his opinion as to whether the
driver's performance has been adversely affected by intoxicating liquor." State v.
Arsenault, 336 A.2d 244, 246 (N.H. 1975) (citation omitted). "[Field sobriety tests]
allow the officer to take notes, give the jury objective descriptions of clinical symptoms,
and add convincing detail to the stock description of slurred speech, staggering gait,
fumbling with wallet, bloodshot eyes, odor of alcohol, and disarray of clothing." Watts,
supra note 175, at 46.
177. No. 94-2516 (PLF), 1998 WL 10364 (D.D.C. Jan. 5, 1998), affd sub nom.
Rogala v. District of Columbia, 161 F.3d 44 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
178. Id. at *2. The officer first instructed the driver to count to five and back on the
fingers of one hand, referred to as the "'finger count' test." Next, the driver was asked to
perform an "'alphabet test"' by "reciting the alphabet from H to Z with his head tilted
backwards." Id.
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driver for a field sobriety test." 179 The court stated:
Because of the significant public interest in preventing a motorist whom an
officer reasonably believes may be intoxicated from continuing to drive, and
because further detention for a field sobriety test is a minimal intrusion on an
already stopped individual's privacy ... many state courts have held that an
officer may detain a motorist for such testing so long as there is reasonable
suspicion that the driver may be intoxicated.180

The court then adopted the reasonable suspicion standard181 for
conducting field sobriety tests and concluded that the test administered
in this case satisfied that standard based on the officer's observations of
the driver and the fact that the driver ran a red light. 182
The tenth circuit similarly embraced the reasonable suspicion standard
in Carlsen v. Duron. 183 Here, police officers stopped Mr. Carlsen on a
suspicion that he was either intoxicated or under the influence of alcohol
after observing a traffic violation and unusual driving behavior. Field
sobriety tests were given and Mr. Carlsen was arrested for driving under
the influence of alcohol. 184 The tenth circuit disagreed with Mr. Carlsen
that his Fourth Amendment rights had been violated by requiring him to
submit to the field sobriety tests. Citing the Kinberg decision, the court
said that the "requisite level of suspicion for Officer Harris to conduct
field sobriety tests" was met where the initial stop was justified by a
reasonable suspicion of intoxication, an observed traffic violation, and
"slow driving and braking." 185
179. Id. at *8. The court stated that "[t]he [U.S.] Supreme Court has not directly
addressed" this issue. Id. The Supreme Court has only stated that, while police may
detain all drivers at sobriety checkpoints without any individualized suspicion,
"[d]etention of particular motorists for more extensive field sobriety testing may require
satisfaction of an individualized suspicion standard." Michigan Dep't of State Police v.
Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990).
180. Kinberg, 1998 WL 10364, at *8. Some state court decisions premise the
reasonableness of field sobriety tests on the existence of a reasonable suspicion of
intoxication. E.g., State v. Lamme, 563 A.2d 1372, 1375-76 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989),
aff'd, 579 A.2d 484 (Conn. 1990); State v. Superior Court, 718 P.2d 171, 176 (Ariz.
1986); State v. Wyatt, 687 P.2d 544,553 (Haw. 1984); Little, 468 A.2d at 617-18.
181. For an overview of the reasonable suspicion standard, see discussion supra
note 61.
182. Kinberg, 1998 WL 10364, at *8.
183. No. 99-4065, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 21428, at *9 (10th Cir. Aug. 24, 2000).
184. Id. at *2-3. Mr. Carlsen was stopped around 1:20 a.m. after making a wide
right hand turn in violation of a Utah statute, driving 20 m.p.h. in a 30 m.p.h. speed zone,
and tapping his brakes twice to slow down for no apparent reason. Id. at *2. He failed
his field sobriety tests. Id. at *3.
185. Id. at *9.
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If a police officer can require a driver to perform field sobriety tests
based on only a reasonable suspicion that the driver is under the
influence, and if, as a result of such testing and the officer's own
subjective observations, the officer is able to form probable cause, the
Sniffer becomes almost superfluous. Probable cause to arrest the driver
for drunk driving only requires "a reasonable ground for belief of
guilt," 186 which "'means less than evidence which would justify
condemnation' or conviction." 187 It does not require the officer's
assessment of intoxication to be right. "[P]robable cause is a flexible,
common-sense standard. . . . [I]t does not demand any showing that
such a belief be correct or more likely true than false." 188

D. Balancing the Vernonia Factors
The balance to be struck in weighing these three factors, the privacy
interest and level of intrusion on the one hand and the governmental
interests on the other, remains somewhat precarious. Initially, it is
difficult to denounce an instrument that has the potential to save lives
and make the roadways safer for all motorists. However, safeguarding
the right to privacy can be no less important.
While all drivers may hold a privacy expectation in their breath, the
level of intrusion imposed by a Sniffer search upon that privacy
expectation and, concomitantly, the efficacy of the Sniffer in achieving
the governmental interests, may differ, depending on the reasons a driver
is stopped in the first place. A stop of a motorist is lawful when the
police officer has a reasonable suspicion that the driver is operating the
vehicle under the influence of alcohol. If a driver is observed weaving
wildly in and out of lanes and otherwise driving erratically, appears
drunk to the officer upon being stopped, slurs his speech, has glassy
eyes, reeks of alcohol, and falls over upon exiting the vehicle, the driver
likely gives the officer the requisite probable cause to make an arrest
before a Sniffer is even operated. Such a driver falls into what shall be
called the "obviously" drunk drivers.
Then there are drivers who are pulled over because they are suspected
of driving under the influence even though the officer does not have
immediate probable cause to make an arrest. Also falling into this

186. United States v. Lewis, 504 F.2d 92, 101 (6th Cir. 1974) (quoting Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)).
187. Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175 (quoting Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
339, 348 (1813)). "In dealing with probable cause ... we deal with probabilities. These
are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on
which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act." Id.
188. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983).
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category are drivers who are stopped for traffic violations-running a
stop sign or driving with a broken taillight-and the officers, through
their own observations in the course of investigating the infraction, come
to suspect possible intoxication. These are the "maybe" drunk drivers,
of whom officers, in addition to making their own subjective
observations, may require field sobriety tests be performed. The Sniffer
in this situation would augment the officer's probable cause assessment
by providing the officer with an approximate BAC.
Finally, there are those drivers who are pulled over for traffic
violations and are never even suspected of having been driving under the
influence of alcohol until the officer operates the Sniffer hidden inside
the flashlight and gets a reading indicating the presence of alcohol.
hnagine, for example, a person who has two glasses of wine at dinner
and on his way home drives perfectly, although he runs through a stop
sign not because he is drunk but because he is simply a bad driver, or
was playing with his radio, or talking on a cellular phone. The officer
pulls this man over to issue a citation for running the stop sign and never
reasonably suspects alcohol to be a factor. Yet simply because he has
the technology at hand, the officer turns on the Sniffer and now knows
the man's BAC. For purposes of classification, these persons will be
labeled the "bad" drivers.
As to the obviously drunk drivers, the level of intrusion on their
privacy interest in informing the officer of their BAC is minimized by
the fact that the individuals clearly exhibit no interest in keeping their
drunkenness hidden from public view. Considering that the probable
cause to justify an arrest already exists, the Sniffer actually is not even
needed. The officer's own subjective observations will be enough. So
while the efficacy of the Sniffer in meeting the government's interest in
detecting drunk drivers as to this particular group of drivers is
questionable, the Sniffer is really not making known any information the
obviously drunk driver has not already revealed. Surely it will be no
surprise to the officer to discover the driver's BAC indicates intoxication.
Moreover, once arrested, the driver can be required to submit to
chemical testing of blood, breath or urine depending on the state's
implied consent law. The intrusion into the privacy expectation of
obviously drunk drivers is negligible; the governmental interest in
getting these drivers off the road must be greater. As to these drivers,
the Sniffer could be constitutional.
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As to the maybe drunk drivers, the Sniffer likely admits to the same
result when the government's interests are weighed against the
individual's interest. Undoubtedly, some drivers who would have been
able to slip through the cracks before by performing field sobriety tests
perfectly and otherwise dispelling the suspicion of intoxication may now
be arrested where the Sniffer's BAC is a dispositive factor in the
officer's evaluation of the situation; the officer may decide, upon seeing
the Sniffer's results, that the BAC along with the officer's observations
is enough to warrant an arrest. Presumably more drunk drivers will now
be arrested because it will not be as easy to fool law enforcement
officials. The intrusion is likely greater here than it is for the obviously
drunk drivers but probably not enough to push the Sniffer into
unconstitutional territory.
The maybe drunk drivers are already suspected of being under the
influence of alcohol before the Sniffer is operated. They can be asked to
perform field sobriety tests, which must be at least as intrusive as a
search of their breath. The Sniffer is operated only to inform the
officer's probable cause assessment; while its results may lead to an
arrest, they may also serve to dispel a suspicion of intoxication and then
the driver is free to go. So while these maybe drunk drivers will lift their
Fourth Amendment shields and decry the intrusion into their privacy, the
government's interests once again will likely prevail.
Raising those same shields even higher are the bad drivers, for it is in
this context that the intrusion seems most egregious. The use of the
Sniffer becomes somewhat of a fishing expedition to catch drivers who
have consumed alcohol in any amount. The officer can get a BAC even
though without the Sniffer he never would have suspected alcohol to be
involved; if any amount of alcohol is indicated giving the officer a
reasonable suspicion that the driver has been drinking, the driver can be
hassled to get out of the car and perform field sobriety tests. But for this
technology, however, the driver would have gotten a ticket for the traffic
violation and gone on the driver's way.
When a driver is stopped, the scope of the officer's investigation is
dependent on the circumstances that led to the detention. 189 An officer
searching a person who just ran a stop sign or who was driving with a
broken taillight for a BAC when that officer has no reasonable basis for
189. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 299 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("When
a person is detained, but not arrested, the detention must be justified by particularized
police interests other than a desire to initiate a criminal proceeding against the person
they detain. The police therefore cannot do more than investigate the circumstances that
occasion the detention."); see also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881
(1975) ("[T]he stop and inquiry must be 'reasonably related in scope to the justification
for their initiation."' (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968))).
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suspecting alcohol consumption is exceeding the permissible scope of
his investigation. The intrusion into matters the driver seeks to keep
private, namely, the driver's BAC, is hardly palatable. The Sniffer is
revealing information that would not otherwise have been disclosed and
possibly leading to further testing of a driver who was merely expecting
a ticket and a slap on the wrist.
For these drivers, the Sniffer has invaded their legitimate expectations
of privacy as to the state of their bodies by impennissibly conducting a
clandestine search of their persons and revealing their BAC to the
detaining officer. The privacy interests of the bad drivers, in light of the
fact that other means already exist to ferret out drunk drivers, might be
important enough to render the Sniffer an unconstitutional violation of
their Fourth Amendment rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
A technological device that is constitutional as to some drivers and
unconstitutional as to others treads into dangerous territory where an
officer has discretion to decide who can and cannot be lawfully tested. It
is foreseeable that an officer could justify his use of the Sniffer on a bad
driver by falsely articulating generalized statements that suggest the
officer had a suspicion of alcohol consumption, thereby turning a bad
driver into a maybe drunk driver.
In Breithaupt v. Abram 190 the Court said:
Modem community living requires modem scientific methods of crime
detection lest the public go unprotected. The increasing slaughter on our
highways, most of which should be avoidable, now reaches the astounding
figures only heard of on the battlefield. The States, through safety measures,
modem scientific methods, and strict enforcement of traffic laws, are using all
reasonable means to make automobile driving less dangerous. 191

Such "modern scientific methods" as passive alcohol sensors must,
however, recognize the constitutional protections afforded every citizen
of the United States. At the rate technology is moving forward, the
privacy interests protected by the Fourth Amendment must be strictly
safeguarded. As the Supreme Court ever so aptly stated: "The question
we confront today is what limits there are upon [the] power of

190.
191.

352 U.S. 432 (1957).
Id. at 439 (footnote omitted).
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technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy." 192 Imagine a
device that could test a driver's blood for a BAC without the driver's
knowledge and without the driver feeling a thing. Surely such a
technological innovation seems intrusive. A point must exist when the
individual's privacy interests trump the technological means that would
render the Fourth Amendment nothing more than mere words that had
force in a world technologically ignorant from the present one.
Technology has the ability to step all over whatever shreds of privacy
individuals can manage to hold onto in the twenty-first century. Yet
because the purpose of some of these devices, such as the Sniffer, is to
aid law enforcement in decreasing crime and increasing safety for all
citizens alike, exactly where the balance between privacy and crimeprevention will be drawn is hard to say. Ultimately, the Supreme Court
will have to tackle the issue and if the people's Fourth Amendment
shields fall this time, given the speed of technological innovation, surely
they will rise again.
JENNIFER HARTUNIAN
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Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).

